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The Making of Cultural Heritage 
Nathalie Heinich
abstract  How does an artefact enter the corpus of national cultural heritage? 
The answer to this question offers a pragmatic understanding of the reasons 
why the expansion of national corpuses has been so widespread, generation 
after generation and especially during the last one. Of course, there are also 
more general “societal” or “cultural” reasons for such a worldwide phenom-
enon: a number of explanations have already been proposed by philosophers, 
historians, sociologists, anthropologists. However, one should not underesti-
mate the effects of the inventorial techniques and methods of description used 
by the specialists of heritage, in that they tend to elevate the level of precision 
and of specialisation, hence to enlarge the criteria and to increase the number 
of artefacts worth entering their corpus. A close study of these actual criteria, 
through a survey conducted according to what is now called “pragmatic soci-
ology” in France, allows us a deeper understanding of what defines cultural 
heritage, and of the effective values on which it relies: that is, the axiology of 
cultural heritage. Switching from “why” to “how” thus opens up for renewed 
insight into the meanings of cultural heritage. 
keywords  Sociology of the arts, cultural heritage, preservation, cultural 
values, patrimonial function
When embarking on my survey of the making of national cultural heri-
tage in France a few years ago, I thought I would be working mainly on the 
aesthetics of a new field, which would allow me to broaden and dev elop 
my inquiries into the sociology of arts, however, surprisingly, I found out 
that aesthetics was but marginal in this context. I also guessed that it had 
to do with environment, since the heritage at stake – “patrimoine,” as we 
call it in France – concerns in situ artefacts, mainly buildings, including 
their relationship to their site. But what I found out was somehow dis-
turbing in light of these expectations: art and aesthetics seem to be very 
marginal issues for the specialists of “patrimoine,” whereas other values 
appear to be much more relevant – some of them being also central in 
environment issues. This is the topic of the following paper. 
No doubt this paper will disappoint those of you who might expect big 
theoretical outcomes often appearing in a congress on sociology, such as 
“culture,” “national identity,” “post-modernism,” or “the social”: all notions 
too often mythified by a metaphysical conception of sociology searching 
for a transcendental principle. Neither would I intend to demonstrate 
that heritage is not an essence but a “socially constructed” phenomenon 
(which, for any sociologist, should never be a final outcome but only 
an obvious starting point from which to explore how a phenomenon is 
created, transformed and sustained by humans). No: I will simply try to 
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describe a particular kind of experience: that is, the patrimonial experi-
ence, from the point of view of the values it implements, and with the 
methods of the empirical, pragmatic and value-free sociology of values I 
am currently developing.
However, I will address this patrimonial experience not through the 
eyes of those who visit monuments or admire old paintings hanging in 
churches, but through the eyes of those who “make” heritage: that is, 
the professional art historians appointed by the Ministry of Culture in 
order to decide whether or not a building or an object should be included 
in the corpus of national heritage. In France, they belong to a special 
administration created during the 1960’s, called the “Inventaire général” 
– General Inventory Service. I presume that most European countries 
have similar services.
Before describing the criteria and value systems used by those special-
ists who decide whether an artefact deserves to be considered part of 
national heritage, I have to say a few words about the dramatic growth 
of the corpus, and some of its possible reasons.
1. The dramatic growth of national cultural heritage,
and some of its possible reasons 
The corpus of national heritage has been dramatically enlarged, gener-
ation after generation, especially during the last one. In France, more 
than 43 000 monuments were protected as part of the “Historical Monu-
ments” (“Monuments historiques”) in 2007, and about 140 are “classified” 
as such every year, whereas from 1836 to 1840, during the first years fol-
lowing the creation of this administration, only 13 had been classified. 
This phenomenon is not specifically French, of course, neither is it spe-
cifically European: in the course of the 20th century, the protection of 
“historical monuments” or “national heritage” has proved still more of a 
necessity at an international level.
Probably, some general “societal” or “cultural” reasons exist for such a 
worldwide phenomenon: a number of explanations have already been 
proposed by philosophers, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists. 
Some historians, for instance, explained the emergence of the very no-
tion of the historical monument in France as a reaction to revolution-
ary destructions. As for sociologists, a similar hypothesis appeared in 
the 1980s, together with the last big patrimonial wave: interest in heri-
tage would grow with destructions, not any more due to revolutionary 
vi olence than to industrial modernisation, especially after the Second 
World War. Let us also quote here the French anthropologist Maurice 
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Godelier; according to him, every society distinguishes between three 
categories of things: those to be sold, those to be given, and those to 
be kept; then the modern cult of heritage would result from a transfer 
of sacredness: patrimonial artefacts would take the place of previous 
“treasures,” be they religious or royal, in the symbolic system of modern 
societies confronted with the “disenchantment process.” 
But rather than trying to explain the causes of our patrimonial infla-
tion, my aim is to describe and understand its modalities from the inside. 
In such a perspective, the “how” will replace the “why,” and comprehen-
sive sociology will replace explicative sociology.
2. The actions of those in charge to “make” heritage?
What about the actions of those in charge to “make” heritage? That is, the 
selection of an artefact in order to include it in the corpus? 
My point is that the inventorial techniques and methods of descrip-
tion used by the specialists of heritage tend to become more and more 
precise and specialised, expanding the criteria of selection and thus in-
creasing the number of artefacts worth entering their corpus.
My survey on the French heritage administration, conducted in 2004 
according to ethnographical methods, helps addressing this issue in a 
renewed perspective, grounded in the close observation of actions with-
in a precise context: what we now call “pragmatic sociology,” based on 
observations in actual situations, focusing on the actors’ actions. I want 
to emphasize that in my eyes, this methodological approach refers not 
so much to “pragmatic” philosophy as to linguistic “pragmatism,” which 
focuses on the actual, concrete uses of language rather than its abstract 
principles. The pragmatic approach considers both objects and subjects 
in terms of their actions, instead of treating them as passive supports 
of projections – be they projections of social categories or of collective 
representations, etc.
Using this pragmatic method, I followed a dozen specialists “on the 
ground” (“sur le terrain”), when they were in the process of observing 
all of the buildings in a given area, in order to decide which ones would 
be worth listing, describing, selecting, or maybe studying. I asked them 
to explicate the problems they encountered and the criteria they used. 
About forty hours of interviews were collected, accompanied by a num-
ber of photographs and documents. The interviews were subjected to a 
thematic analysis. The results have been published in a number of ar-
ticles and, finally, a book, La Fabrique du patrimoine. 
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3. The criteria actually used
As an outcome of this survey, I was able to illuminate the actual criteria 
used by the specialists of heritage, and confront these specialists with the 
norms they are expected to implement in their work. 
These criteria rely on a number of what James Gibson would have 
called “affordances” (for instance, the shape of a window). As for the cri-
teria (for instance: the date of the building), some of them are officially 
prescribed (that is, listed in the methodological guide edited by the di-
rection of this administration), whereas others are not, because they are 
considered marginal or too problematic. On another level some of them 
are univocal (they are always positive, in any context: this is the case of 
ancientness), whereas some of them are ambivalent (they may be posi-
tive or negative depending on the context: for instance, rarity).
Four categories of criteria could thus be listed, by comparing their 
proximity to “official” norms or prescriptions, on the one hand; and their 
vulnerability to contextual variations on the other. The first axis thus op-
poses prescribed to unauthorized criteria; the second axis opposes uni-
vocal to ambivalent criteria. When crossing these two axes, we obtain 
four main categories of criteria:
(1) prescribed and univocal criteria (mainly: state of conservation and 
age);
(2) prescribed and ambivalent criteria (mainly: rarity of similar 
items);
(3) latent criteria (for instance: material accessibility of a building);
(4)  one proscribed criterion: beauty, since it is considered too subjec-
tive to sustain a scientific treatment of the heritage corpus. How-
ever, words pertaining to the aesthetic vocabulary (“beautiful,” 
“ugly” and so on) sometimes appeared in the commentaries of the 
researchers I observed, but always mid-voice or with a laughter, 
betraying the illegitimate status of such a criteria in this context.
About twenty criteria have been discerned through this survey, belonging 
to these four categories. This was the first step of the analysis. I will not 
develop this list of criteria here, because I want to insist on the next step, 
that is, the values underlying those criteria. By “values” I simply mean the 
principles governing value judgements.
4. Underlying fundamental values
The second step revealed a small number of fundamental values as un -
der lying these criteria. These five basic values are:
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(1)  the value of authenticity, referring to the integrity of the bond 
between the present state of the object and its origin. This value 
is an absolute condition, present in any case: it may be considered 
the very core of heritage;
(2)  the value of ancientness, referring to the length of the bond to 
the origin: absolutely relevant for a more traditional or common-
sensical conception, relatively relevant for a more scientific con-
ception;
(3)  the value of rarity, referring to the small number of items existing 
in the same category: more relevant for a traditional or common-
sensical conception, whereas the scientific approach may value an 
item for its belonging to a series;
(4)  the value of beauty, whatever its criteria: harmony, symmetry, el-
egance, sophisticated adornment etc. (relevant for a traditional or 
commonsensical conception); or typicality, perfect matching with 
the properties of the category (relevant for a scientific approach);
(5)  the value of signification, referring to the capacity to convey a 
meaning, to symbolize something, to accept commentaries, inter-
pretations etc.: more relevant for a scientific approach.
Except for the value of authenticity, which is always present, these values 
vary according to the different conceptions of heritage: between the tra-
ditional or commonsensical conception, at one end of the chain, and the 
more scientific conception, at the other – the latter being the very scope 
of my survey. 
5. Families of values
The third step of the analysis showed how these five values may be re-
lated to more general “value registers” – that is, more general families of 
values, which are relevant in many other contexts of social life: from con-
temporary art to bullfighting, from politics to scientific life, from religion 
to sports. Out of several surveys I have been completing on various situ-
ations of value judgements, a set of a dozen “value registers” have been 
established until today: ethical, aesthetic, aesthesical, hermeneutic, civic, 
juridical, economic, domestic, functional, reputational, purificatory.
As for the issue of national heritage, the relevant repertoire of value 
registers allows us to refer the value of ancientness to the register called 
“domestic,” following here the model of “justification” topics explicated 
by two French sociologists, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. In their 
model, the “domestic” register fosters respect for the elders, familial 
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belonging, confidence, care for transmission: all these requirements 
are obviously present in the very notion of heritage, be it familial or 
national.
As for the value of authenticity, it pertains to what I call the “purifi-
catory” register, concerning all the values akin to integrity and, in par-
ticular, integrity of the bond with origins – a reason why it includes as 
well authenticity as hygiene or ecology. Here is a strong bond between 
heritage and environment: both rely on a requirement for purity, which 
may result as well in the value of authenticity as in the value of “ecologi-
cal correctness.”
As for the value of signification, it pertains to the “hermeneutic” reg-
ister, fostering the search for a meaning, interpretative activity, symbol-
ism. It is central in the more scientific approach of heritage – that of the 
specialists of the Inventaire I observed – whereas it seems to be replaced 
by the value of beauty for less specialized and more common sense or 
profane relationship to heritage.
This value of beauty pertains to the “aesthetic” register, dealing with 
the notions of art and beauty. It is essential here to notice that this regis-
ter is far from being the central one governing the relationship to heri-
tage. In particular, it would be heavily misleading to confuse this aes-
thetic register with the purity register or with the hermeneutic register: 
requirement for authenticity or for meaning does not necessarily entail a 
requirement for beauty. Contemporary art, as I tried to describe it in my 
previous research, is an obvious example of this necessary distinction 
between beauty, authenticity and meaning. Heritage is another case.
But what about the value of rarity I mentioned earlier? It does not 
pertain to any “value register,” but to another and more general kind of 
category, that I propose to call a “value realm,” as I will now explain.
6. The two value realms
At the fourth and final step of the analysis, two “value realms” have been 
discerned, at a very general level. This high level of generality allows 
comparisons with other value systems in different contexts. The two 
realms are the “singularity realm” (“régime de singularité”) and the “com-
munity realm” (“régime de communauté”).
To understand what they mean, let us go back to this value of rarity. You 
may have noticed that I did not relate this value to the “value registers” 
I just mentioned. The reason is that rarity possesses a somehow special 
status. It is an ambivalent value, since it may be positive or negative: posi-
tive according to the traditional conception of heritage, focusing on a few 
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master works (“chefs-d’oeuvres”); but negative according to a more scien-
tific approach, trying to discern series and types, to construct typologies, 
to produce statistics. More specifically, the value of rarity does not stand 
on the same level as the other ones: rather, it is an index, a mark bestowed 
on any value, be it negatively or positively. For instance, beauty may be 
defined by conformity to the accepted rules (community realm) or, on the 
contrary, by originality (singularity realm); authenticity may be found in 
series (community realm) or in individuals (singularity realms); significa-
tion may be valorised in that it is accessible to all (community realm) or, on 
the contrary, in that it is esoteric (singularity realm). 
This is why rarity, together with its contrary, multiplicity, are what could 
be called “orthogonal values,” which encompass all the others, either to re-
inforce them or to weaken them. Thus they pertain to a more general order 
than the “value registers”: what I call a “regime” (“realm”) of qualification 
– “qualification” meaning both “definition” and “valorisation.” In this per-
spective, the “singularity realm” valorises all that is rare, out of the ordinary, 
unique; whereas its opposite, the “community realm,” valorises the many, 
the standard, the conventional. Let us notice by the way that the notion 
of monument is strongly bound to the “singularity realm” (since its pat-
tern is the “chef-d’oeuvre,” the exceptional artefact), whereas the notion of 
heritage pertains to the “community realm” (since it belongs to a commun-
ity). This double axiological status of national heritage, or “patrimoine,” 
is probably one of the reasons why such an issue is so rich and powerful, 
for sociologists as well as for the actors: it may fulfil expectancies of both 
singularity as well as expectancies of community.
This whole set of affordances, criteria, values, value registers and value 
realms constitutes what might be called the “axiology of cultural heri-
tage”: in other words, the system of values proper to this very special do-
main of our common culture. Here a new road opens up to the sociology 
of values I am proposing – a non-essentialist, pragmatic, empirical and 
axiologically neutral sociology, as announced in my introduction.
And here, a possible answer to the question I raised at the beginning 
of my paper emerges: The main reason why the corpus of national heri-
tage grew so fast during the last generation is probably not to be found 
in issues of “identity,” “culture,” “post-modern society” or the like: rather, 
the reason lies in the introduction of more scientific methods of selec-
tion in the administration of culture, which tend to minimize the place 
of beauty while extending the borders of ancientness, fostering the value 




Let me conclude with one last remark about the definition of heritage. 
After having observed how national heritage is made by its specialists, 
one may ask the question: what is, after all, a “patrimonial” object?
7. From heritage to “patrimonial function”
No doubt you will have understood that I am not trying to give any kind 
of ontological, a priori definition of heritage: according to the nominal-
istic turn, what is at stake here is to understand what actors mean when 
they use this term, or when they act in order to bestow such a qualifica-
tion on an object. This is why, rather than “heritage” or “patrimoine,” I 
prefer to speak of a “patrimonial function”: just as Michel Foucault spoke 
of “author function,” or as I myself spoke of “person function” (“fonction-
personne”) when referring to some categories of objects characterized by 
their substitutability – be they relics, fetish or art works. In this perspec-
tive, heritage or “patrimoine” appears as nothing more than the peculiar 
state resulting from some objects being submitted to certain kinds of 
operations, through gestures, writings, words, laws, financial exchanges, 
etc. These objects may be either artefacts (as in the case of historical 
monuments) or natural objects (as in the case of sites or landscapes); 
they may even be immaterial, according to the UNESCO’s new category 
of “immaterial heritage.”
According to such a perspective, this patrimonial function may be de-
fined as the whole set of actions intended to conserve objects that satisfy 
a double condition: first, the condition that they belong to the community, 
being considered as a common good (even if they remain a private prop-
erty on a juridical level); and second, the condition that their value will 
last forever; this everlasting value itself originates from four main axi-
ological principles, in other words four values: authenticity (pertaining 
to the purity register), ancientness (pertaining to the domestic register), 
signification (pertaining to the hermeneutic register) and beauty (per-
taining to the aesthetic register). These four values may be more or less 
enhanced by a fifth one: rarity (pertaining to the singularity realm).
The first of these two conditions – belonging to the community – is 
tied to a spatial grandness in that it extends the number of the concerned 
beings; without it, nothing would distinguish a patrimonial artefact from 
a simple familial commodity, such as the picture in my living room. As 
for the second condition – everlasting value – it is tied to a time-related 
grandness in that it extends duration; without it, nothing would distin-
guish the patrimonial artefact from a simple common good, such as a 
road sign or a telephone pole. 
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So the patrimonial function allows an object to shift from the state of 
a private good to that of a “common good,” as defined by economists: that 
is, avoiding both exclusion – since its consumption is open to everyone 
– and rivalry – since this consumption does not diminish its available 
quantity. The patrimonial object thus escapes the destiny of becoming 
rubbish, as described by Michael Thompson, as well as that of a mere 
“thing,” reducible to its materiality and its utility. It may then become 
what the historian Krystof Pomian called a “semiophor,” invested with 
meanings, or even a “relics” or a “sacred object”: one which may be nei-
ther sold nor given, but only conserved, as in Godelier’s typology.
In other words, the status of national heritage is the same as the status 
of aesthetics, in that both of them are defined not by a substantial but 
by a relational property. As the French aesthetician Gérard Genette ac-
curately stated: “It is not the object which makes the relation aesthetic, 
but it is the relation which makes the object aesthetic.” Similarly, it is not 
the object which makes heritage, but it is the patrimonial function which 
makes a patrimonial good out of an object.
Finally, what should we call such a process, through which pre-exist-
ing qualifications are bestowed on some objects, so that they become at-
tached to these objects in such a way that they appear to be part of them, 
defining their very nature? What is at stake here is neither to “discover” 
the value of the object (since the object does not “contain” this value, it 
does not possess it), nor to “invent” it from nothing, as if it had been ar-
bitrarily bestowed (since the object more or less fosters or allows such or 
such a qualification). Let us rather say that value is “administrated” to the 
object: that is proposed, then attached to it, in a more or less efficient and 
long-lasting way according to the capacity of the object to accept such a 
qualification. We can then conclude that the mission of the patrimonial 
administration – that is, the department of the Ministry of Culture in 
charge of historical monuments – is indeed to “administrate” – that is, to 
take care of – the heritage artefacts that have been listed by specialists; 
but its mission is also to “administrate” – that is, to bestow – the value of 
authenticity on those objects that are to be listed. This is why the depart-
ment in charge of historical monuments may be defined, in the double 
sense of the term, as the administration of authenticity. 
Administrating authenticity: these two words summarize, as a con-
clusion, what is at stake with national cultural heritage. I will let you 
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